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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Wolde ye bothe eate your cake, and haue your cake?”  This proverbial 
saying dates to mediaeval times, first appearing in 1546.1  Despite the dramatic 
change in language and spelling, the meaning of this phrase was never lost in 
translation.  One cannot simultaneously eat one’s cake and retain possession of 
one’s cake.  Both trademark owners and the Copyright Office want to have their 
cake and eat it too.  Trademark owners are trying to register their trademarks as 
copyrights.  The Copyright Office wants to deny such marks, but under a weak 
lack of a creativity argument.  Allowing trademarks to be registered as 
copyrightable works violates the clear doctrines of the boundaries of protection 
available in each area of intellectual property law.  
There is no direct rule from Congress or the Supreme Court that a logo or 
slogan cannot also be a copyrightable work.  However, the necessary 
intellectual property law boundaries are in place for good reason and support 
the argument presented herein that a clearly demarcated line between copyright 
and trademark protection must also be drawn.  That clear demarcation should 
 
1. Ben Zimmer, ‘Have Your Cake and Eat It Too’, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, (Feb. 18, 
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/20/magazine/20FOB-onlanguage-t.html. 
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be that an image originally created, exploited, and that functioned as a copyright 
may later meet trademark’s requirements and therefore be eligible for 
concurrent trademark and copyright protection.  However, a mark originally 
created, exploited, and that functioned as a trademark cannot receive copyright 
protection, concurrent or sequential, regardless of creativity.  This is 
determined by the applicant declaring during their copyright application that 
the work seeking registration is not a designator of a source of goods under 
penalty of fraud on the Copyright Office.2 
In Section I, this comment discusses the differences between trademarks 
and copyrights.  In Section II, this comment analyzes the rules for copyrighting 
trademarks and the arguments in favor of copyrighting trademarks.  In Section 
III, this comment addresses the problems of arguing that trademarks fail 
copyright requirements for a lack of creativity.  In Section IV, this comment 
weighs the arguments against copyrighting trademarks.  Section V concludes 
by proposing a bright line rule for either Congress or the courts to adopt to 
provide guidance that copyrighting a trademark is prohibited.  
II.  THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS 
A trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof” that is registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
and is used in commerce “to identify and distinguish” the source of goods and 
services.3  To be trademarked, the mark must either be distinctive or attain 
secondary meaning through public association.4  Therefore, trademark law 
protects the source identifying function of goods and services.  Contrarily, a 
copyright is an original work of authorship, such as a literary, musical, 
audiovisual, or pictorial work, that is fixed in a tangible medium of expression.5  
Therefore, copyright protects the expressive content of works.  
Copyright protection is granted by the Constitution’s Intellectual Property 
Clause which grants Congress the authority “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors … the 
exclusive Right to their [] Writings and Discoveries.”6  Copyright protection is 
designed to incentivize authors to create creative works.  In 1879, the Court 
distinguished copyright and trademark protection when the Supreme Court 
 
2. 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1) (2008); 17 U.S.C. § 506(e) (2008).  
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).  
4. Id.  
5. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990). 
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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ruled that the Commerce Clause does not give Congress any power to regulate 
trademarks not used in commerce.7  
In contrast, Trademark protection is granted by the Constitution’s 
Commerce Clause which grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce 
… among the several States ….”8  Trademark protection is designed to ensure 
consumers are informed as to the source of the goods they purchase.9  
Moreover, for famous trademarks, protection encompasses the likelihood of 
harm caused by the blurring or tarnishing caused by a knock-off mark 
regardless of “likely confusion, [] competition, or [] actual economic injury.”10  
Copyright and trademark protection were created for different purposes and 
therefore have different protections and limitations.  Thus, it is no surprise that 
the boundaries between the two have blurred.  
III.  THE RULES FOR COPYRIGHTING TRADEMARKS AND THE ARGUMENTS IN 
FAVOR THEREOF 
What is required for something to be creative?  The Compendium, the 
Copyright Office’s administrative manual, Section 913.1 states “[a] visual art 
work that is used as a trademark, logo, or label may be registered if it satisfies 
‘the requisite qualifications for copyright.’”11  The Copyright Act’s enumerated 
categories of works of authorships is broad enough to cover most trademarks.  
Also, fixation is not a barrier for trademarks seeking copyright protection so 
long as the trademark has been drawn, recorded, or computer generated  
Therefore, to copyright a trademark, copyright’s originality requirement is the 
last element.  Copyright’s originality standard requires a minimally creative 
work that is not copied.  However, creativity is never defined in the Copyright 
Act.12  Given the difficulty in defining and recognizing creativity, over a 
century ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes warned that “[i]t would be a 
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute 
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the 
narrowest and most obvious limits.”13  Therefore, today, copyright’s creativity 
requirements remain minimal. 
In Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., the Court ruled that a work 
need only an “extremely low” amount of creativity.14  In fact, Feist held that 
 
7. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 95-96 (1879). 
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
9. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2019). 
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). 
11. U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium of U.S. Copyright Practices § 913.1 (3d. ed. 2017). 
12. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010). 
13. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).  
14. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
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“[t]he vast majority of works make [copyright] grade quite easily.”15  Moreover, 
elements of a work that are not copyrightable in themselves, may be 
copyrightable if arranged in an original way.16  Therefore, copyright’s creativity 
requirements are generally not a barrier for marks seeking copyright 
registration. 
However, an arrangement of individually, not copyrightable elements 
cannot be “so commonplace that it has come to be expected,” such as listing 
something in alphabetical order.17  Moreover, the Compendium Section 906.01 
reads “a work that merely consists of common geometric shapes [is not 
registrable] unless the author’s use of those shapes results in a work that, as a 
whole, is sufficiently creative.”18  There are examples in Section 906.01 of 
common geometric shapes arranged in an insufficiently creative manner.19  
However, these examples are not insightful as these are clearly uncreative 
marks.20  Additionally, Section 913.1, which states that trademarks may be 
copyrighted, further states that the Copyright Office “typically refuses to 
register trademarks, logos, or labels that consist of only … [w]ording … [m]ere 
spatial placement or format of trademark, logo, or label elements; [or] 
[u]ncopyrightable use of color, frames, borders, or differently sized font … 
either standing alone or in combination.”21  
Therefore, given the Compendium’s language, the Compendium’s 
creativity standards for trademarks and logos, especially those consisting of 
geometric shapes, (geometric trademarks) are much more difficult than the 
standard proscribed in Feist.  Despite this inconsistency between the federal 
courts and the Copyright Office, trademarks owners have still been trying to 
register their trademarks with the Copyright Office.  In trademark owners’ 
view, trademarks are original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium 
of expression.  Thus, trademarks should be copyrightable, especially if the 
counterargument is a lack of an extremely low amount of creativity.  Moreover, 
proponents of copyrighting trademarks will likely point to the current overlap 
between copyright and trademark protection.  
In 1934, the court found that the Frank Merriwell character “[was] closely 
identified in the public mind with the work of a particular author, [and was 
protectable] . . .. even after the expiration of the copyright, unless adequate 
 
15. Id.  
16. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a compilation). 
17. Feist, 499 U.S. at 363. 
18. U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium of U.S. Copyright Practices § 906.1 (3d. ed. 2017). 
19. Id.  
20. Id. 
21. Compendium (Third) § 913.1. 
FORELLA_FINAL_MACROED (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/20  12:21 PM 
2020]  MICKEY MOUSE VS. THE MUTANT COPYRIGHT  81 
 
explanation is given to guard against mistake.”22  In 1962, in Planters Nut & 
Chocolate Co. v. Crown Nut Co., the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
declared that copyright and trademark protection is available for a fanciful 
picture of a humanized peanut used as a design mark to identify and distinguish 
the source of peanuts.23 
In Frederick Warne & Co., Inc. v. Book Sales, Inc., the publisher of the 
“Peter Rabbit” books sued a competitor publishing versions of Peter Rabbit that 
were in the public domain, and thus, no longer protected by copyright law.24  
However, plaintiff brought trademark infringement claims for the cover 
illustrations and eight drawings of characters from the “Peter Rabbit” books.25  
Despite being sequential, rather than overlapping protection, the court held that 
“[t]he fact that a copyrightable character or design has fallen into the public 
domain should not preclude protection under the trademark laws so long as it 
is shown to have acquired independent trademark significance, identifying in 
some way the source or sponsorship of the goods.”26  
In Lyons Partnership, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., the owners of the 
Barney character successfully brought copyright and trademark infringement 
claims against a costume rental company for renting “look-alike costumes that 
children allegedly believe are in fact Barney.”27  Walt Disney is particularly 
aggressive in seeking concurrent copyright and trademark protection.  For 
example, in Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, Disney brought copyright and trade 
dress claims against a vendor selling graphic depictions of Mickey Mouse.28  In 
Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, regarding several Disney characters 
including Mickey Mouse, the court noted that Disney “devoted considerable 
effort and resources to developing a recognition of [Mickey Mouse], and 
exploiting its value in numerous ways.”29  
When Mickey Mouse was created as a cartoon and fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression, Mickey Mouse was copyrightable.30 As time passed, 
Mickey Mouse became much more than a cartoon character.  Mickey Mouse 
became a source identifying function.  The public now associates Mickey 
Mouse’s likeness with Walt Disney, assuming his presence means Disney 
 
22. Patten v. Superior Talking Pictures, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 196, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). 
23. Planters Nut & Chocolate Company v. Crown Nut Company, Inc., 305 F.2d 916, (C.C.P.A 
1962).  
24. Frederick Warne & Co., Inc.  v. Book Sales Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
25. Id. at 1194. 
26. Id. at 1196. 
27. Lyons Partnership, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 794 (4th Cir. 2001). 
28. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 698 F. Supp. 10, 11 (D.D.C. 1988). 
29. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108, 109 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
30. Id. at 113. 
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produced, sponsored, or approved any product Mickey Mouse appears on.  
Thus, Mickey Mouse earned trademark protection despite originally 
functioning as a copyright.31  Trademark owners, therefore, can argue that 
concurrent and sequential trademark and copyright protection exists.  Further, 
the Copyright Office overstepped its authority by creating a more stringent 
creativity standard for geometric trademarks, violating the proscribed 
extremely low creativity threshold set forth in Feist.32  
IV.  WHY ARGUING THAT TRADEMARKS FAIL THE COPYRIGHT REQUIREMENT 
BECAUSE THEY LACK CREATIVITY IS A PROBLEM 
Another argument in favor of copyrighting trademarks is that the difference 
between the Copyright Office’s creativity standard for geometric trademarks 
and Feist’s extremely low standard has recently resulted in numerous 
controversial and inconsistent decisions by the Copyright Office.  For example, 
the Copyright Office Review Board (CORB), the appellate body of the 
Copyright Office, denied copyright registration to the Union des Associations 
Européennes de Football’s (UEFA) Starball logo for insufficient creativity.33  
The Starball is a two-dimensional artwork consisting of black curved stars and 
white polygons intended to appear as a three-dimensional soccer ball.34  
UEFA argued that while typical geometric shapes are not copyrightable, 
the stars and polygons used in their artwork were not typical because they are 
curved to appear as a soccer ball.35  CORB cited Compendium Section 906.1, 
likening the Starball to white circles on a purple background.36  CORB’s higher 
creativity demands regarding trademarks and logos is clear in its refusal to 
register the UAC Triangle Design.37  Here, the Copyright Office concluded that 
the selection and arrangement of geometric shapes lacked the sufficient 
creativity because they “[we]re not arranged in a way that creates a new, 
unfamiliar shape.”38  Surely, creating a new, unfamiliar shape would be 
creative, but is far from Feist’s extremely low creativity threshold. 
 
31. Walt Disney Co., 698 F. Supp. at 12. 
32. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991). 
33. United States Copyright Office Review Board, Second Request for Reconsideration for 
Refusal to Register “The UEFA Champions League Starball Device”; Correspondence ID 1-
2WP8WG4; SR 1-4149565625 (July 30, 2018). 
34. Id. at 1.  
35. Id. at 4.  
36. Id. 
37. United Stated Copyright Office Review Board, Second Request for Reconsideration for 
Refusal to Register UAC Triangle Design; 5 Correspondence ID: 1-25K4EEH; SR 1-3120971803 (Jan. 
31, 2018). 
38. Id. at 5.  
FORELLA_FINAL_MACROED (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/20  12:21 PM 
2020]  MICKEY MOUSE VS. THE MUTANT COPYRIGHT  83 
 
Another clear example of the higher creativity demands regarding 
trademarks and logos is the Copyright Office’s recent American Airlines 
rulings.  American Airlines tried to register a red, white, and blue-colored logo 
that depicts the wings of an airplane and an eagle in flight.39  American Airlines 
argued the logo was more than basic shapes because of its arrangement and 
abstraction of those shapes.40  The Copyright Office ruled that the logo “falls 
below the threshold for creativity” because it is “comprised of basic geometric 
shapes.”41  CORB characterized the logo as a “dual-colored, curved trapezoid 
with a bisecting, shaded and curved triangle” and that its “insignificant 
variations in shape [or] … coloring… [do not] change [the work’s] character; 
trapezoids, rectangles, and triangles are all basic geometric shapes.”42  Based 
on CORB’s own language, American Airline’s logo combines creative, 
uncommon geometric shapes and certainly meets Feist’s extremely low 
creativity thresholds.  
After receiving “a higher-quality, larger-format image of the Work that 
depicted additional details,” the Copyright Office reversed its decision and 
registered American Airline’s logo.43  In its decision, CORB stated that “[w]hen 
examining a work for copyrightable authorship, the Copyright Office evaluates 
only whether a work is sufficiently creative for copyright protection” and does 
“not consider the time and effort used in creating a design, its novelty, aesthetic 
appeal, or commercial value.”44  These are traditional factors in a trademark 
analysis.  Ultimately, CORB granted American Airline’s logo merely “thin” 
copyright protection “against only virtually identical copying” because the 
“quantum of originality is slight.”45 
The problem with the Copyright Office’s recent decisions is that these 
marks likely meet Feist’s extremely low creativity threshold, thereby creating 
inconsistent rulings and tension with the federal courts.  For example, cases 
before and after Feist have found that the combination of geometric shapes 
contain sufficient creativity and merit copyright protection.  
In Titlecraft Inc., v. NFL, the court held that the National Football League’s 
(NFL) trophy for its annual Super Bowl champion is copyrightable because 
 
39. U.S. Copyright Office Review, Second Request for Reconsideration for Refusal to Register 
American Airlines Flight Symbol; Correspondence ID: 1-28H4ZFK; SR#: 1-3537494381 (Jan 8. 
2018).  
40. Id. at 4.  
41. Id. at 4-5. 
42. Id. at 4. 
43.  United States Copyright Office Review Board, Registration Decision Regarding American 
Airlines Flight Symbol; 5, 7, Correspondence ID 1-28H4ZFK; SR 1-3537494381 (Dec. 7, 2018).  
44. Id. at 6.  
45. Id. at 6 citing Beaudin v. Ben and Jerry’s Homemade, Inc., 95 F.3d 1, 2 (2d Cir. 1996). 
FORELLA (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/20  12:21 PM 
84 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 24:1 
 
“the combination of uncopyrightable elements in an original way renders the 
trophy appropriate for copyright protection.”46  The court rejected the argument 
that the trophy was not copyrightable because it is merely a football on top of 
a base because “at some level of abstraction, all objects are combinations of 
geometric shapes; that does not mean they cannot be protected by copyright … 
it is the trophy’s combination of the base, with the football on top, at a certain 
angle, that is protectable….”47  The court likened the argument that the trophy 
consists only of common geometric shapes to the argument that “‘there can be 
no originality in a painting because all colors of paint have been used 
somewhere in the past.’”48  The different creativity standards applied by federal 
courts and the Copyright Office is problematic and must be realigned.  Hopeful 
copyright registrants must be aware of the requirements of copyright and 
uniform decisions are vital to a fair copyright registration process. 
V.  THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST COPYRIGHTING TRADEMARKS 
Although a geometric trademark may be sufficiently creative, this does not 
mean it should be copyrightable.  The examples of concurrent or sequential 
copyright and trademark protection are limited to cartoon characters.  As the 
court mentioned, “[d]ual protection under copyright and trademark laws is 
particularly appropriate for graphic representations of characters.”49  The 
previously mentioned cartoon characters all met the copyright requirements—
were originally created, were exploited, and functioned as copyrights—and 
then later met the trademark’s requirements.  None of the previously mentioned 
cartoon characters were originally created, exploited, or functioned as 
trademarks that later sought copyright protection.  As copyright and trademark 
protection overlap, they provide more protection than is necessary to satisfy the 
objectives of each protection.  
Congress and the Supreme Court created boundaries for each form of 
intellectual property to limit overprotection.  Providing more protection than is 
necessary harms the public, contrary to the purpose of intellectual property 
protection.  For example, copyright protection is earned as soon as the creative, 
original mark is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, whereas a trademark 
must be used in interstate commerce.50  Therefore, if a trademark owner can 
protect their mark under copyright law, they can warehouse the mark from the 
public, as copyright has no use in commerce requirement.  Additionally, under 
 
46. Titlecraft, Inc. v. NFL, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134367, 1, 12-13 (2010). 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 12-13 citing Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd. Inc., 71 F.3d 996, 1003 (2d Cir. 1995). 
49. Frederick Warne & Co., Inc.  v. Book Sales Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.  
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a copyright rather than trademark infringement claim, one need not prove 
likelihood of confusion, which is designed to protect the public.51  
Also, any fair use defense typically available under copyright law would be 
eliminated as there is no fair use of another’s trademark.  Fair use is a 
foundational element of the societal bargain in copyright law that allows the 
public to make fair use of works for certain purposes despite being a 
copyrighted work.52  Moreover, copyrighting trademarks and thereby treating 
trademarks as expressive speech implicates significant First Amendment 
concerns.  A trademark can prevent the speech of another if there is a likelihood 
of confusion.  If one can trademark an expressive phrase that should be 
protected under copyright, one could prohibit another’s speech through 
trademark law without any fair use defenses.  As of 2017, it is more difficult to 
deny political, expressive phrases that are attempting to gain trademark 
protection, especially after the Court equivocated trademark and copyrights in 
the same case.53 
Furthermore, the expanded scope of what can be trademarked and 
copyright’s expanded length of protection is concerning.  In 1998, copyright 
protection was extended through the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA).54  
Under the CTEA, despite the constitutionality being challenged, Congress 
increased the length of copyright protection to the life of the author plus seventy 
years, and included a retroactive extension for all pre-existing copyrights.55  
In contrast, trademark protection always lasted, so long as the mark was 
used in interstate commerce or until the mark became generic.56  Through 
Congress and various decisions by the federal courts, federal trademark 
protection has vastly expanded over the last several decades.57  In 1946, 
 
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
52. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994); 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992). 
53. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760 (2017) (ruling trademarks may not be denied for 
being immoral, disparaging, or scandalous and conflated trademarks and copyrights by stating 
“trademarks often have an expressive content … powerful messages can sometimes be conveyed in 
just a few words.”). 
54. 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2002). 
55. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1998); see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S.Ct. 769, 776 (2003); see Symposium: 
Panel II: Mickey Mice? Potential Ramifications of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 771, 781 (2003); Keith Gluck, The Birth of a Mouse, THE WALT DISNEY FAMILY 
MUSEUM BLOG (Nov. 18, 2012), https://www.waltdisney.org/blog/birth-mouse (arguing that Congress 
passed the CTEA to extend Mickey Mouse’s copyright as without the CTEA, Mickey Mouse’s 
copyright would have expired in 2003, but will now last until 2023 despite being created in 1928.).  
56. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining abandonment); see also Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior 
Sleep Systems, Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 101-02 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding generic marks are not eligible for 
trademark protection).  
57. Mark A. Lemley, Symposium: The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 
108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1688 (1999).  
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Congress expanded trademark law when it passed the Lanham Act, which 
provides protection for unregistered marks.58  In 1955, Congress also passed 
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, which provides a dilution claim despite 
no likelihood of confusion, even for non-competing and non-identical marks.59  
Today, under trademark protection, companies can protect a source-identifying 
color, source-identifying sounds, and even a restaurant’s theme.60  
The Copyright Office should be more skeptical of not just geometric 
trademarks, but any trademark trying to gain copyright protection.  However, 
the Copyright Office should not deny trademarks via an insufficient creativity 
argument, but rather, for illegitimate extension of trademark protection through 
copyright law and a necessary demarcation between the boundaries of 
copyright and trademark law.  Without a division, companies can circumvent 
trademark protection’s bounds through copyright law.  The following cases 
illustrate the federal courts stance towards concurrent intellectual property 
protection overall.  
In Baker v. Selden, the Court held that copyright protection does not extend 
to an idea itself, but only the expression of that idea.61  This core concept of 
copyright law is called the idea/expression dichotomy or merger problem.  The 
plaintiff in Baker copyrighted his book describing his double-entry 
bookkeeping system.62  However, the illustrations to exemplify the system were 
not protectable under copyright law because they were ideas and examples of a 
system.63  Despite the systems likely meeting copyright requirements, the Court 
correctly ruled that the following are patentable, not copyrightable: ideas, 
procedures, processes, systems, methods of operations, concepts, principles or 
discoveries embodied in a copyright work.64  
Despite not being copyrightable subject matter, these systems were ripe for 
protection under a different form of intellectual property, patent law.65  
Therefore, someone using the same system as Selden, even using the examples 
provided in his copyrighted book, would not be infringing on Selden’s 
copyright because the examples are necessary to enact the system.  Thus, to 
 
58. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1126 (1946).  
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1955).  
60. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Products Co., Inc.,  514 U.S. 158, 172 (1995) (protecting color); 
see generally UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, Trademark “Sound Mark” 
Examples, https://www.uspto.gov/trademark/soundmarks/trademark-sound-mark-examples; Two 
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 776 (1992) (protecting a restaurant’s theme). 
61. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1879).  
62. Id. at 101. 
63. Id. at 103.  
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
65. Baker, 101 U.S. at 104. 
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protect these examples under copyright law would be a backend route to protect 
a system, which is the subject of patent, not copyright law.66  Essentially, the 
ideas for how to carry out the system cannot be copyrightable.  Moreover, the 
underlying system in the work is not copyrightable subject matter and there is 
a limited number of ways to express this creative and original idea.  Therefore, 
even if identically expressed, such expression does not warrant copyright 
infringement because the expression of the idea is merged with the non-
copyrightable idea, making the expression of that idea non-copyrightable as 
well.  Simply put, ideas and systems are patentable, not copyrightable.67  
Additionally, in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, the Court faced 
the problem of sequential protection between a patent and trademark.68  When 
Marketing Display’s patent expired, TrafFix reverse engineered it and sold a 
very similar product.69  Marketing Display sought trademark infringement, but 
the Court ruled against Marketing Display’s plea for sequential protection.70  
The Court considered public policy regarding creative, inventive works and 
referred specifically to the right to copy.71  The Court stressed the non-
functionality requirement for trademark protection and found that the 
distinction between trademark’s non-functionality and patent’s utility 
requirement must remain clearly demarcated.72  After making that distinction, 
the Court rejected Marketing Display’s attempt to extend an expired patent’s 
protection using trademark law73  
Federal courts have directly expressed concerns with copyrighting 
trademarks.74 For example, the Second Circuit stated the “[o]verextension of 
trade dress protection can undermine restrictions in copyright and patent law 
that are designed to avoid monopolization of products and ideas.  Consequently, 
courts should proceed with caution in assessing claims to unregistered trade 
dress protection so as not to undermine the objectives of these other laws.”75  In 
Galerie v. Coffaro, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s trademark claim because 
the plaintiff should have “brought [the claim] under the federal copyright, not 
 
66. Id.  
67. Id. at 105. 
68. Traffix Devices, Inc., v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 26 (2001).  
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 35. 
71. Id. at 29. 
72. Id. at 32-33. 
73. Id. at 34-35. 
74. Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 32 (2d Cir. 1995). 
75. Id.  
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trademark, statute.”76  The Ninth Circuit addressed concurrent trademark and 
copyright holding: 
This [movie] clip is [not] a trademark … the [movie clip] … was clearly 
covered by the Copyright Act … and the Lanham Act cannot be used 
to circumvent copyright law. If material covered by copyright law has 
passed into the public domain, it cannot then be protected by the 
Lanham Act without rendering the Copyright Act a nullity.77  
Likewise, in Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc. v. ABC Communs., Inc., the court 
rejected a trademark claim where copyright properly applied because otherwise 
it “would simply transform every copyright action into a Lanham Act 
action….”78  In EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos, 
Inc., the court held that a song cannot be a trademark for itself as that “would 
allow any copyright claim for infringement … to be converted [] into a Lanham 
Act cause of action … [and] stretch the definition of trademark … too far [by] 
… protecting the very essence of the song, an unwarranted extension into an 
area already protected by copyright law.”79 
In Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., the Supreme Court 
was again directly faced with the issue of sequential protection, denying an 
attempt to extend copyright protection through trademark law.80  The plaintiff, 
Twentieth Century Fox (Fox), alleged trademark infringement in a previously 
copyrighted work that expired when Fox failed to renew its registration.81  
Dastar edited Fox’s work and sold it at a lesser cost.82  The court rejected Fox’s 
attempt to protect its work with trademark law after its copyright protection 
expired.83  The Court defined a “mutant copyright,” as when a copyright owner 
 
76. Galerie Furstenberg v. Coffaro, 697 F. Supp. 1282, 1290 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
77. See Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. New Line Cinema, 200 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2000); 
see also Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1364-1365 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting a concurrent copyright 
and trademark protection attempt for a pilot script. The court heard the copyright claim, but not the 
trademark claim because doing so would expand trademark protection in a way “[in]consistent with 
the Lanham Act’s purpose of preventing individuals from misleading the public by placing their 
competitors’ work forward as their own.” The court specifically referred to the concurrent protection 
problem by refusing “to expand the scope of the Lanham Act to cover cases in which the Federal 
Copyright Act provides an adequate remedy.”). 
78. Murray Hill Publications, Inc., v. ABC Communications, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 754, 761 
(E.D. Mic. 1999).  
79. EMI Catalogue Pshp. v. Hill, Holiday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 
30761 18,19 (2d Cir. 2000). 
80. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 25 (2003).   
81. Id. at 26-27. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 34-35. 
FORELLA_FINAL_MACROED (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/20  12:21 PM 
2020]  MICKEY MOUSE VS. THE MUTANT COPYRIGHT  89 
 
attempts to use trademark law to protect the previously copyrighted work.84  
While Dastar overruled sequential protection for an expired copyright via 
trademark law, it did not directly address concurrent protection.  
While rare, there are marks that are concurrently copyrights and 
trademarks, such as Mickey Mouse.  Under Dastar, once Mickey Mouse’s 
copyright expires, the right to copy him should pass in to the public domain.  
Trademark protection after Mickey Mouse’s copyright expiration would create 
a “mutant copyright.”  In Dastar, Fox’s trademark claims were easy to reject 
relative to Disney’s trademark rights in Mickey Mouse.  Mickey Mouse 
entering the public domain would create mass consumer confusion as any 
company would be free to copy Mickey Mouse.  This contradicts trademark’s 
purpose of avoiding consumer confusion and free-riding another company’s 
good will.  
Dastar looks to balance the right to copy after a copyright’s expiration 
against trademark’s perpetual protection so long as the mark is continually used 
in interstate commerce and avoids becoming generic.  Dastar finds that the 
harm to the public and mark owners denied sequential protection are 
outweighed by the public benefit received from the right to copy the work.85  
Public policy supports the right to copy, but also supports protecting Mickey 
Mouse as a trademark because his passing into the public domain would cause 
consumer confusion and free-riding off Disney’s good will.  However, 
protecting Mickey Mouse as a trademark is contrary to Dastar’s holding against 
sequential trademark protection after a copyright’s expiration.  Therefore, while 
Dastar resolved the issue of sequential protection, marks such as Mickey 
Mouse that have concurrent trademark and copyright protection are left 
stranded.  
Dastar and these other cases look to maintain clear demarcations between 
the scopes of intellectual property protection, and copyright and trademark 
protection specifically.  Otherwise, trademark protection can form into a mutant 
copyright and eliminate the public’s right to copy, which is crucial to the 
societal bargain, advancement of new creative works, and overall access to 
knowledge.  While Dastar resolved the issue of extending copyright protection 
via trademark law, the reverse of Dastar, using copyright law to extend 
trademark protection, must be regulated for the same policy concerns of Dastar.  
Clear demarcations between other areas of intellectual property law exist for 
good reason and for these same reasons a clear line between copyright and 
trademark law is necessary.  Without clear demarcations between copyright and 
trademark law, the protection for creative works, whether trademark or 
 
84. Id.  
85. Id. at 35-36.  
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copyright, may extend into absolute rights.  For example, in Video Pipeline Inc., 
v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t., Inc., a federal district court held that copying 
previews of Disney’s movies was copyright and trademark infringement 
because Disney’s characters were both copyrights and trademarks.86  However, 
the court enjoined not only showing the parts of the previews with the 
trademarked characters, but the entire preview.87  This protected the entire work 
through trademark law, despite trademarks appearing in only parts of the work.  
Had the plaintiffs been required to use copyright protection, they would have 
been required to show unauthorized use of their creative works that was 
substantially similar to the original and that no infringement defenses were 
available.  A copyright infringement claim is far more difficult to prove than 
the trademark claim that was used.  Further, defendants are harmed if they 
unnecessarily settle, enter licensing agreements, or stop using the work thereby 
robbing the public, due to uncertain litigation concerns.  
VI.  TO TRADEMARK A COPYRIGHT, NOT COPYRIGHT A TRADEMARK, THAT IS 
THE RULE  
Trademark owners and the Copyright Office cannot have their cake and eat 
it too. Trademark owners cannot also have copyright protection.  The Copyright 
Office cannot have an extremely low standard and then deny marks that clearly 
meet this low standard.  Cases that did not overrule overlapping intellectual 
property protection deal with an overlap where different areas of intellectual 
property protect different aspects.  The cases not overruling concurrent 
trademark and copyright protection deal with trademark protection for a mark 
originally created, exploited, and that functioned as a copyright that later 
functioned as a trademark.  Therefore, it is necessary to draw a line that an 
image originally created, exploited, and that functioned as a copyright may later 
meet trademark’s requirements and therefore be eligible for concurrent 
trademark and copyright protection.  However, a mark originally created, 
exploited, and that functioned as a trademark cannot also later receive copyright 
protection.  
To determine if a mark was originally created, exploited, and functioned as 
a trademark or a copyright, the applicant must declare as part of the copyright 
application process under 17 U.S.C. § 409 that the work seeking registration is 
not a designator of a source of goods under penalty of fraud on the Copyright 
Office.  A knowingly fraudulent representation would lead to invalidation of 
the copyright application if it is material—meaning of such a nature that it 
 
86. Video Pipeline v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, 275 F. Supp. 2d 543, 564, 577 (D.N.J. 
2003). 
87. Id. at 564, 577.  
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would have caused the Copyright Office to refuse registration.88  Failing to 
notify the Copyright Office that the mark seeking registration is a trademark 
would surely qualify as a material fraudulent representation that would 
invalidate the copyright application because under the rule proposed herein a 
mark that functions as a source identifier would never be granted copyright 
protection.  
This declaration removes the burden from the Copyright Office and any 
third parties.  Also, while this may result in concurrent copyright and then 
trademark protection, this puts the burden on the applicant to use the work 
seeking copyright registration as a copyrightable work, typically before any 
trademark protection would be available.  If said work meets copyright’s 
minimal requirements and then later functions as a trademark, this is acceptable 
so long as the work originally functioned as a copyright typically does—such 
as expression aesthetic or artistic meaning.  The mark functioning as a 
copyright typically does benefit and enrich the public as copyright law 
intended.  If a mark is used or intended to be used as a source identifier without 
first functioning as a copyrighted work, the mark was created, exploited, and 
functions as a trademark.  For such a mark, trademark protection alone should 
apply without the potential for concurrent or sequential copyright protection.  
However, a work originally created, exploited, or that functioned as a copyright 
is one that is used or intended to be used to express some aesthetic, expressive, 
or artistic meaning.  For such a mark, copyright and then trademark protection, 
even concurrent, is available.  
Mickey Mouse, for example, would comport with this rule because Mickey 
Mouse was originally created, exploited, and functioned as a copyright.  Then, 
only after time, Mickey Mouse functioned as a trademark and satisfied 
trademark’s requirements.  Mickey Mouse thus should be eligible for 
concurrent copyright and trademark protection.  Moreover, this rule comports 
with Dastar in that it only allows for concurrent protection and disallows 
sequential protection if the copyright does not seek trademark registration prior 
to the copyright’s expiration or alleged trademark infringement.  Therefore, the 
copyright must seek trademark protection while the copyright protection is 
valid.  Such a mark cannot seek trademark registration after the copyright’s 
expiration or after the alleged copyright infringement.  
This rule demarcates clear boundaries between copyright and trademark 
law and closes a circumvention of trademark law’s bounds through copyright 
law, while not contradicting trademark’s purpose of avoiding consumer 
confusion.  No test is foolproof and the same holds true for this rule.  
Specifically, a mark owner could originally create, exploit, and function a mark 
 
88. 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1). 
FORELLA (DO NOT DELETE) 8/11/20  12:21 PM 
92 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 24:1 
 
as a copyright to gain copyright protection all along, knowing the mark’s true 
purpose is to serve as a trademark.  If the mark meets copyright’s requirements 
and then later meets trademark’s requirements, the mark would gain concurrent 
copyright and trademark protection.  However, defrauding the Copyright Office 
is illegal and the minimum examinations by the Copyright Office will snuff out 
bad faith registrations.  Moreover, and most importantly, if the work’s creator 
exploits the work as a copyright typically does, this inherently benefits and 
enriches the public and comports with copyright law’s purpose. 
The loss of a few images from the public domain—because such images 
can comport with this rule and therefore be eligible for concurrent copyright 
and trademark protection—is outweighed by the mass consumer confusion and 
illegitimate free-riding that would result from longstanding trademarks such as 
Mickey Mouse falling into the public domain due to Disney’s copyright 
expiration.  In fact, this exception to this proposed rule that allows concurrent 
protection is not contrary to the purpose of the rule.  The purpose of this rule is 
to protect against copyrighting a trademark, not against granting trademark 
protection to a copyright.  This rule is designed to either prevent a trademark 
originally created, exploited, and functioned as a trademark from also receiving 
copyright protection, or to make such work also function and be exploited as a 
copyright prior to being eligible for trademark protection.  
The rule does not resolve the right to copy concerns of Dastar.  Such 
concerns are unavoidable without rendering Mickey Mouse into the public 
domain, and further contradict trademark’s purpose of making the marketplace 
fair, avoiding consumer confusion, and eliminating illegitimate free-riding.  
Therefore, this rule balances over-extending trademark protection by 
prohibiting copyrighting a trademark against trademark’s purposes, and 
legitimate concurrent trademark and copyright protections for copyrights that 
now serve a source identifying function. 
If a work is originally created, exploited, and functioned simultaneously as 
a copyright and a trademark, then copyright registration would be possible with 
potential concurrent future trademark protection.  For example, if a company 
creates a character for an advertisement, so long as the character has some 
expressive use, copyright protection is available.  If this character later becomes 
a source identifying function, the character can also be trademarked.  A clear, 
systematic approach is necessary.  This rule allows for the enhancement of the 
public domain, the maintenance of the incentive to create works that progress 
the science and arts against marketplace fairness, and the avoidance of mass 
consumer confusion and free-riding.  The Supreme Court or Congress should 
adopt the proposed rule herein to provide guidance to an unclear area of law 
that, if left unattended, allows mark owners to undermine, circumvent, and 
extend the boundaries of trademark law through copyright. 
